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ABSTRACT
Recently, the VP community has been identified as a force area where reserves could
be used more in peacetime contributory support. The subsequent increased interaction
between reserve and active VP forces has led to a similar readiness system.
The current VP readiness system promotes long-term, fixed crews with TACNUC
rules. Adhering to these crew composition rules can cause considerable scheduling difficulties
for reserve squadrons. Squadron readiness officers are often forced to change events, pick
different crews, or turn the event into a practice session due to last minute civilian
commitments of SELRES crewmembers.
This thesis examines current crew-coordination research to determine the value of
keeping crews together. The study proposes alternatives to the current TACNUC rules and
analyzes their perceived impact according to SME interviews.
This study recommends discarding the TACNUC rules in favor of a readiness system
based on individual qualifications. The desired crew-coordination training can be
accomplished through the ongoing TPC and ACT programs. Standardization of crew
communication patterns and positional task expectancies should continue so that each
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Historically, reserve VP squadrons have supported active duty squadron deployments
while obtaining yearly readiness qualifications. Recently, the VP community has specifically been
identified as a force area where reserves could be used more in peacetime contributory support.
The subsequent increased interaction between reserve and active VP forces has led to a similar
readiness system.
The current VP readiness system promotes long-term, fixed crews with TACNUC rules.
These rules require four tactically essential crewmembers present for initial readiness
qualifications and three of four present for yearly currency qualifications. Adhering to these crew
composition rules can cause considerable scheduling difficulties for reserve squadrons. Squadron
readiness officers are often forced to change events, pick different crews, or turn the event into a
practice session due to last minute civilian commitments of SELRES crewmembers. Subject
Matter Experts (SMEs) interviewed estimated that as much as 50% of scheduled events are
typically affected.
Previously, these TACNUC constraints have been viewed as an acceptable cost of doing
business with the premise that crews who flew together often, would become more familiar and
commit fewer tactical or safety errors.
This thesis examines current crew-coordination research to determine the value of keeping
crews together. The study proposes alternatives to the current TACNUC rules and analyzes their
perceived impact according to SME interviews. This study also presents crew attributes for a
typical reserve squadron as compared to its active duty counterpart. As expected, reserve
crewmembers showed more experience in terms of both individual flight hours and months since
xi
initial positional qualification. Reserve crewmembers also tend to stay in the same squadron and
on the same crew much longer than active duty crewmembers.
Early crew composition research indicated that crews who had flown together before
performed better than those who had never flown together. However, current crew composition
research, on long-term, fixed crews, indicates that performance and safety decreases over time.
The Air Force and Army studies cite overfamiliarity, complacency, and a less explicit crew-
coordination style as factors explaining mixed crews outperforming fixed crews.
Accordingly, this study recommends discarding the TACNUC rules in favor of a readiness
system based on individual qualifications. The desired crew-coordination training can be
accomplished through the ongoing TPC and ACT programs. Standardization of crew
communication patterns and positional task expectancies should continue so that each individual
crewmember can perform well on any crew. Discarding the current TACNUC rules is expected
to promote a more explicit crew-coordination environment. Explicit crew-coordination improves
mission effectiveness, as well as, the overall safety of flight operations.
Changing the TACNUC policy has the additional benefit of increasing training resource
efficiency. SMEs interviewed predict associated squadron readiness levels will increase as much
as 30-40 % with relaxed TACNUC restrictions.
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I. INTRODUCTION
With the end of the Cold War, U.S. military forces began a process of mission
assessment and force reductions that continues today. Although most of the personnel
reductions (right sizing) are complete, a redesign of the roles and missions needed to meet
the new threats is ongoing. A key element in this aspect of force planning is the new roles
and missions reserve forces will assume. There is a trend, among all the services, to de-
emphasize the reserve's mobilization role and increase the amount of peacetime
augmentation of active duty forces. This shift has occurred for two main reasons:
Active duty force reductions have left fewer active forces to meet the world-wide
operational commitments, making reserve augmentation an attractive option.
In an era of decreasing defense budgets, utilizing reserves has been viewed as a
"return on investment" of the dollars spent training reservists during their prior
active duty careers.
As this shift swept through the DoD, the Maritime Patrol (VP) community was in the
process of changing its readiness system. In 1995 both reserve patrol wings adopted the new
readiness system used by active duty VP squadrons. In an effort to promote a seamless Total
Force, the reserve patrol wings made very few changes to the active duty system (the only
major differences reflecting equipment specific to reserves vice active duty). One of the
objectives this new readiness system is to encourage squadrons to leave their twelve man P-3
crews together longer and go through the qualification process as a crew rather than as
individuals. This emphasis on crew coordination is an extension of safety research (Kanki and
Foushee, 1989) which showed that some mishaps, on multi-crewed airplanes, could be
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avoided through crew coordination training. Research further indicated that military
effectiveness of a crew also increased with crew coordination training (Povenmire, Rockway,
Bunecke, and Pattonl989). With this in mind, the readiness system developed forced active
duty squadrons to qualify their crews during the home cycle with the same crew list that they
would later use throughout a deployment.
The new system seemed to translate well to typical reserve operations prior to their
increased amount of peacetime (Contributory) support (CS). Before the heavy emphasis on
CS began, a typical VP reserve squadron would send half of the squadron to a forward
deployed site for two weeks each summer. The other half of the squadron would report to
the same site for the following two weeks. During this one month period, reserve crews
would fly "direct support" for the active duty squadron deployed at the same site. These
flights were primarily training flights that the reserve crews used to get their yearly
qualifications. Keeping crews together was not particularly difficult since the crews were
away from their civilian commitments for the entire two weeks. At the end of this "active
duty" month, the reserve squadron would leave with many crews fully qualified for the entire
upcoming year.
While the new readiness system was being implemented, active duty VP force
structure cuts demanded even greater use of reserve forces to supplement the day-to-day
active duty operations. This changed typical reserve squadron deployed operations by making
reserve crews more a part of the day-to-day operations. It also decreased the amount of
independent training opportunities reserve crews could complete during their two week active
period.
One drawback of using VP reserves more throughout the year, was that their
readiness began to deteriorate by one to two readiness categories 1 . While contributory
support allows for some excellent real-world training opportunities, the operations rarely
involve all mission areas. The OASD reserve report acknowledges this point by stating,
While participation in active duty missions generally provides excellent
training for aviation and support units, some drawbacks do exist, especially
in combat aviation. In many instances, the missions flown during ongoing
peacetime contingency operations fulfill only a small portion of the aircrew's
training requirements. Extended periods of supporting active missions results
in the crews falling behind in total training requirements, and an extended
period may be required for crew members to return to previous readiness
status. (OASD Reserve Affairs Homepage)
The decrease in diverse training opportunities while deployed means that reserve
squadron training officers now need to gain the bulk oftheir crew's qualifications during drill
weekends rather than the two week annual training period. For reserve squadron training
officers, accomplishing these qualifications, while meeting the new readiness system's crew
coordination rules has become quite an incredible challenge. Under the current system, an
unexpected sickness or civilian work requirement of one key crew member often turns a long
planned qualification event into a practice session (freeplay) with no associated readiness
points2
.
This thesis focuses on how the change in reserve operations has affected meeting
1 According to SME interviews detailed on page 10-1 1.
2 A squadron training officer may first attempt to re-assign the qualification to a
different crew however, other crews may not need the particular qualification or may not
be available on short notice.
readiness requirements for the reserve patrol squadrons. More specifically, this study
examines the balance between the crew coordination rules within the VP readiness system and
each squadron's ability to schedule and complete their crew's readiness qualification events.
The readiness system modifications examined by this study attempt to ease some of
the scheduling difficulties caused by the crew coordination rules yet, minimize any loss in
crew coordination training. This study also points out some of the differences between the
typical active duty crewmember and the typical reserve crewmember in terms of time in
position, time in squadron, time on current crew, previous experience etc. These differences
may have implications for the crew coordination training needed for active crews vs. reserve
crews.
A. INCREASED USE OF RESERVE FORCES
1. Force-wide increase
The increase in peacetime reserve use previously mentioned is certainly not unique to
VP forces rather, it reflects a trend among all services to incorporate reserve forces into daily
world-wide commitments. The increase in contributory support was primarily driven by the
DoD Bottom-Up Review recommendations and the congressionally-mandated Commission
on Roles and Mission Study's conclusion:
In the future, the role of the reserves will increase in importance, particularly
as a critical element in deterring potential enemies who might try and take
advantage of a situation when we are engaged in a major regional
contingency. If deterrence fails, the reserves must provide the forces that will
enable us to fight and win. (RAND, 1992 p.296)
The use of reserves in operations supporting active duty forces has become more than
an operational trend. Instead, reserve forces are now an integral part of most ongoing
operations. For example, the Honorable Deborah R. Lee. Assistant Secretary of Defense for
Reserve Affairs, speaks of the Reserve's new role:
Although the wartime role of the reserve forces is very important, I
want to underscore the importance of the peacetime support role the reserves
are playing today, as well as the importance of this role for the next twenty
five years.
We are currently in one of the busiest and most complicated periods
of peace our military has ever known. While the bulk of a major military
downsizing is behind us, budgets remain tight and the tempo of day-to-day
military operations remains high. As a result, the National Guard and reserve
have a tremendous opportunity to do more and to demonstrate how
effectively they can support the peacetime operations of the Total Force,
(raweb . osd . mil/docs/esgrm8 . htm)
This evolution of roles has had a great impact on how all reserve units operate on a
day-to-day basis and on how they measure their contribution to the Total Force. With more
active force integration, reserve forces have had a greater pressure to mirror their active duty
counterparts in both equipment and training. Reserve forces also now spend a much greater
percentage of their budgeted training time on active component support. In fact, compared
to other reserve branches, the shift has been most dramatic for the Naval Air Reserve Force.
The table below shows the reserve component percentage of annual training(AT), active duty
for training (ADT), and inactive duty for training(IDT) allocations dedicated to the support
of the active component missions for Fiscal Year 1994 through Fiscal Year 1996.
Training Dedicated to Active Component Support
Service FY 94 FY 95 FY 96
Army National Guard
Annual Training, (AT)
Active Duty for Training, (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Army Reserve
Annual Training (AT)
Active Duty for Training, (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Naval Reserve (Air)
Annual Training. (AT)
Active Duty for Training (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Naval Reserve (Surface)
Annual Training (AT)
Active Duty for Training, (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Air National Guard
Annual Training. (AT)
Active Duty for Training. (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Marine Corps Reserve
Annual Training. (AT)
Active Duty for Training, (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Air Force reserve
Annual Training, (AT)
Active Duty for Training. (ADT)
Inactive Duty for Training
Coast Guard Reserve
Annual Training, (AT)
Active Duty for Training, (ADT)









































































(OASD Reserve Affairs Homepage)
2. Increased use of VP Reserve Forces
The close similarity between VP reserve and active duty squadrons made the VP
community a prime target for downsized active forces and an increased role for the reserve
component. VP forces were specifically mentioned in former Senator Sam Nunn's
congressional budget testimony.
...Currently a third of the P-3 fleet is operated by reserve units. By most
accounts, they perform the ASW mission very well, even though they are
given the oldest and least capable aircraft. Transferring modern P-3's to Navy
reserve P-3 squadrons and deactivating some active squadrons could save
between $1.5 and $1.8 billion over five years. (S. Nunn remarks before
Congress. 20 April 1990)
a. Flexible drilling
In 1994 Admiral Tom Hall, then Chief of Naval Reserves, introduced a
concept of 'flexible drilling'. The goal of flexible drilling, as stated by Admiral Hall was,
...to refocus the requirements to devote drill deck and Annual Training time
from specific mobilization requirements and change direction to allow
Reservists to perform day-to-day tasks appropriate to their rank and skill
level. (Naval Reservist, November 1996. pg 1.)
The Naval reserve policy statement discusses flexible drills by mandating;
All echelons throughout the Naval Reserve will ensure that every effort is
made to perform the maximum number ofAT and IDT periods at the gaining
command consistent with available funding. Maximum flexibility will be
employed to schedule these periods so they support peacetime support needs
of the gaining command consistent with the attainment of the requisite
readiness status, (available online U.S. Naval Reserve homepage)
Flexible drilling encourages reserve unit commanders to lump together two-day drill periods
into longer periods so that reserve members can spend these drills on deployed contributory
support rather than only training in the local area. For VP reserve crews this meant flying out
to a deployed VP site to offer plane and aircrew rather than conducting training in the local
area.
b. Increase in VP contributory support
Reserve VP wing training officers indicated that CS contribution required of
each reserve squadron has increased dramatically. In late 1994 reserve squadrons were
required to provide the wing with two to four "crew weeks" 3 per squadron Today each
squadron is tasked to provide a minimum of 22 crew weeks and frequently asked for up to
26 crew weeks. For the Atlantic reserve patrol wing this sums to a total oftwo planes and
two aircrews 44 weeks per year. The active fleet is now pressuring for a full two aircraft and
two aircrew year-round commitment.
B. GOALS AND OBJECTIVES
The goal of this study is to investigate tradeoffs between the current crew composition
constraints, or crew coordination 'rules', in the VP reserve readiness system with the
scheduling difficulties they create. In a time of limited budgets every effort should be made
to examine the true value of each step in any military process. If one views the readiness
qualification as a process, it is important to assess whether the crew coordination rules really
provide a benefit equal to or greater than their associated costs.
Since no readiness system or method of training is really an end unto itself, the real
goal is to provide a better product to the fleet and to better use limited training resources.
3 Crew weeks are a measurement of manpower and are an entire P-3 aircrew for
seven days
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Therefore, this study attempts to link current crew coordination research to the VP readiness
system and to suggest improvements that will maximize efficiency while minimizing any loss
in quality of training.
C. SCOPE AND LIMITATIONS
This study is not designed to be a comprehensive analysis of the VP reserve readiness
system. It is presented as a starting point in recognizing some of the differences between VP
reserve crews and their active duty counterparts and how their differences should shape
readiness training and crew coordination training. This study attempts to apply known crew
coordination studies from other communities to the current VP readiness system. Although
this study discusses differences between active duty and reserve crews, it is understood that
the final trained and qualified product—a combat ready aircrew—should have nearly the same
capabilities whether or not the crew is active or reserve. Therefore, this study addresses the
training involved in producing a reserve crew that can meet its active duty support
requirements.
This study is primarily conducted through interviews with subject matter experts
(SME's). Future studies should attempt to quantify and test the ideas presented in this thesis.
Also, in the interest of keeping the study unclassified, specific squadron readiness levels are
not mentioned. Alternatives will discuss the percentage increase in readiness expected by
squadron training officers without mentioning the squadron's specific readiness level.
D. RESEARCH QUESTIONS
Primary Research Question:
What are the tradeoffs between the current readiness system's crew
coordination rules considering the scheduling problems and missed training
they create for reserve squadrons?
Subsidiary Questions:
1. How has the increase in reserve peacetime (contributory) support
affected readiness training and the crew qualification process?
2. Is there a significant experience difference (measured by time in squadron
and time in position etc.) between active and reserve crews?
3. What is the scheduling impact (canceled events and lost qualification
opportunities) of the crew coordination rules on reserve crews?
4. Can the new Tactical Proficiency Course (TPC) system replace or
compliment the crew-coordination aspects of the current readiness
qualification process?
5. What is the political feasibility and impact of changing the Navy
reserve VP readiness system.
E. METHODOLOGY
There were two phases to this research effort. First, a focus group interview was
conducted with active duty VP personnel available at the Naval Postgraduate school The
focus group format was modeled after Focus Group Interviews in Education and Psychology
(Vaughn, Schumrn, and Sinagub, 1996). The purpose of this group interview was to gain an
active duty perspective of how reserves have historically interacted with their active duty
counterparts and discuss the perceived impact of future increases in reserve contributory
support. The members interviewed had all worked with reserves at many levels ranging from
first-tour Lt, department head, Tactical Support Center (TSC) commander, up to Wing
commander.
Building on the focus group results, reserve Subject Matter Experts (SME) were
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interviewed following the guidelines presented in Talking it Over: Research With Human
Sources (Bednarz D. and Wood, D. 1991). In person and telephone interviews were
conducted with current and former reserve squadron commanding officers and wing Chief of
Staffs. At this higher rank level the interviews were primarily information interviews as
defined by Bednarz and Wood. Next, in-depth interviews were conducted with current and
former Wing training officers and squadron training officers. All interviews were semi-
structured and the initial questions mirrored this study's subsidiary research questions:
1
.
How has the change of squadron operations due to increased fleet contributory
affected the crew readiness qualification process?
2. What are the differences between a typical reserve crew member from his/her
active duty counterpart?
3 Which crew coordination rules within the readiness system are the most
challenging to meet?
4. How should the TPC system fit into the current VP readiness system?
5. What are the likely impacts of this thesis' s proposed changes?
F. ORGANIZATION
This thesis is divided into six chapters. Chapter I gives a general background of recent
trends in the use of reserve forces. Chapter I also defines what this study attempts to
accomplish and acknowledges any limitations. It also gives the reader an understanding of
the environment in which the examined policy exists and the thought process used to examine
the issue.
4 For further discussion on information interview, in-depth interview, and semi-
structured format see (Bednarz and Wood p. 117-119)
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Chapter II reviews the history of crew resource management (CRM) studies. Other
service's crew composition studies are summarized and their applicability to the VP readiness
system are discussed.
Chapter III gives an overview of the recent past and current VP force structure for
both active and reserve forces. The different crew members on a VP crew are described,
explaining their duties and rank. Typical crew attributes (time on crew, time in position, total
flight time, etc.) are compared for an active duty squadron versus a reserve squadron. This
chapter highlights some ofthe experience differences between active duty crew members and
their reserve counterparts.
Chapter IV explains the current VP readiness system and defines the crew
coordination aspects built into the system. The chapter also gives an overview of the Tactical
Proficiency Course (TPC) which also has an impact on VP crew coordination training. Lastly,
the alternatives developed for this study are defined and explained.
Chapter V presents the SME interview findings. Within this chapter, three criteria are
used to analyze the study's alternatives; anticipated increase in squadron readiness, perceived
impact on crew coordination, and the political feasibility of implementing the change.
Finally, Chapter VI provides the VP reserve community with some recommendations
for improving the current readiness system. It specifically addresses the crew coordination
aspects of the readiness system and how training resources might be better utilized without
a significant loss in crew coordination.
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O. LITERATURE REVIEW
A. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW OF CREW COORDINATION
The study of crew coordination or cockpit resource management (CRM) has a
relatively short history in aviation. The real beginning was a 'kickoff workshop held at the
NASA Ames Research center in 1979. Also in 1979, two important studies indicated a need
for CRM training. Ruffell Smith (1979) studied the effect of workload on performance and
noted that crew effectiveness was related to the crew's overall decision making, leadership,
and resource management. In anothei study, John Lauber (1979) identified over 60 airline
accidents that were directly attributed to a breakdown in crew coordination. These studies,
combined with public pressure concerning commercial aviation safety, led the air carrier
industry to move beyond technical flying skills training and address crew interaction. In
many cases, airline companies instituted CRM programs after high-profile CRM related
accidents. For example, KLM's CRM course following the Pan Am/KLM crash in 1977 and
the 1985 Delta accident in Dallas which prompted Delta to create a CRM training program
(Jensen, 1995).
For many reasons the military aviation community was slow to follow the CRM trend.
Technologically, the military did not have the 'black box' equipment to record the final
moments of a crash. Therefore, many possible CRM related military accidents causes were
left as undetermined. There was also far less public outcry for increasing the safety of military
flights since a much smaller amount of people were typically affected. Also an important
organizational difference is that an airline company can dictate a training policy for its entire
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company while the military has many different aircraft commands and individual squadrons
with differing missions and training needs (Prince and Salas, 1993). The differences between
military and civilian CRM requirements were highlighted in the joint NASA and Air Force
Military Airlift Command CRM workshop. Cavanagh and Williams (1987) noted six
categories of differences: purpose of the organization, qualifications of the crews, rank
distinctions, responsibilities of the crew, and labor relations. Despite these significant
differences, military aviation did see that CRM principles could improve the safety of its
operations and by the late 1980's each service had some type ofCRM program.
Within the Navy, CRM training was a Naval Safety Center initiative in response to
human error being identified as a causal factor in many accidents. The Navy CRM program
was renamed aircrew coordination training (ACT) and was very similar to the commercial
airline Flight Deck Management (FDM) program. The subject areas for this training were
policy and regulation, command authority, communication, available resources, workload
performance, decision making, situational awareness, and operating strategy. The program
was implemented Navy wide by having each squadron designate two instructors. These
instructors were then given ACT instructor training which supplied them with the materials
and the know-how to give a two day ACT seminar to their squadron (Prince and Salas
1993).
The program has evolved further and now includes seven basic ACT skills and









The new instruction defines the purpose ofACT by stating, "practicing ACT principles will
improve mission effectiveness and reduce mishaps that result from poor crew coordination".
(OPNAVINST 1542.7A, p. 1)
Two points stand out when looking at the evolution ofNavy ACT training. First,
ACT has moved from a 'safety only' focus and has extended ACT to include mission
effectiveness. Second, the course has progressed from an attitude change emphasis to
behavioral skills training. This shift allows for more comprehensive measurement of specific
coordination behaviors which are then used to develop realistic line-oriented simulator
scenarios. (Prince and Salas, 1993)
B. CREW COMPOSITION STUDIES
Traditionally the military has approached crew coordination on two fronts;
standardized training in CRM and assigning crews to fly together permanently (often called
battle rostering). While many studies have validated the positive impacts of standardized
training alone, or in combination with permanent crew assignment, there has been little
research on crew assignment effects alone. One reason for this lack of research is that the
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permanent crew assignment option is primarily a military one. With decreased scheduling
flexibility and the overall increased cost of permanent pairings, the airline industry has not
had any real interest in researching the long term effects of permanent crew assignments.
Two particular studies, one military and one civilian, have lead most people to assume
that flying together as a permanent crew does improve performance and safety. Kanki and
Foushee (1989) used a high-fidelity flight simulator to observe the communication pattern of
crews who had never flown together versus crews who had flown together. Their analysis,
using communication indexed crew interaction, concluded that crews who had flown together
showed improved information exchange and committed fewer crew errors. Although this
conclusion seems to be intuitively obvious, it is important to remember that the study
compared crews who had never flown together with those who had (never vs. occasional).
It did not compare those who had flown together occasionally with crews who were
permanently assigned together (occasional vs. permanent). Within a military squadron,
comparing a battle rostered crew with a mixed crew would more closely match the occasional
vs. permanent comparison. It would be unusual in a VP squadron to pick a mixed crew that
had never flown together. The Kanki study also fails to address any negative effects, such as
overconfidence and complacency, that may come from flying on a more permanent basis.
Another widely quoted crew coordination work is the B-52 study by Povenmire,
Rockway, Bunecke, and Patton(1989) which measured bomb accuracy of permanently
assigned B-52 crews who had been given CRM training. The researchers concluded that
operational performance was positively correlated with CRM training. This study was
significant in that CRM training could now be applied to the entire tactical crew for improved
16
operational performance rather than only the flight crew for improved safety.
With the B-52 and Kanki study in mind, military aviation squadrons focused on crew
coordination through more permanent crew rostering and squadron-wide CRM training. The
VP community addressed both areas with its 1995 readiness system's focus on crew rostered
qualifications and the TPC 5 course's emphasis on CRM type tactical training.
While the military aviation community took CRM and battle rostering to heart,
aviation accident investigation reports coupled with anecdotal data suggested that battle-
rostering was potentially having a negative impact on the safety of operations. A subsequent
Air Force study on military transport accident rates concluded that mixed crews were
significantly safer than battle rostered crews (Woody, Mckinney, Barker, & Clothier 1994).
In 1994 the Army decided to research the specific impact of battle-rostering
independent of the known positive effects of squadron-wide crew coordination training
(Simon and Grubb, 1994). The study was conducted using twelve two-man AH-64 crews
with one pilot and one copilot gunner on each crew from three squadron's battle rostered
crew list. All 24 crewmen had been through the Army's aircrew coordination training so that
battle rostering effect alone could be studied. These original 24 crewmembers were randomly
paired to form twelve mixed crews. All aviators conducted two missions on their battle-
rostered crew and two missions on a mixed crew in the AH-64 combat mission simulator.
Crew performance was analyzed in terms of crew behaviors, task performance, mission
performance, and flight safety as measured by instructor pilots.
5 The Tactical Proficiency Course and the VP 'battle rostered' qualification
process are discussed in Chapter IV.
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The study concluded that battle-rostered crews did not perform any better than their
mixed crew counterparts in navigation, threat avoidance and evasion, in-flight emergencies
and malfunctions. Only one performance area, gunnery, showed a slight positive effect for
battle-rostering. Additionally, simulator exit surveys indicated complacency and
overconfidence among the battle rostered crews.
Battle-rostered crews overrated their performance 50% more than did mixed
crews. Crewmembers and IP evaluators commented that overconfidence can
lead to complacency. Crewmembers rated their crew coordination style as
more implicit when in a battle-rostered crew than when in a mixed crew.
Implicit crew coordination coupled with overconfidence is a potentially
detrimental combination with adverse effects on mission performance and
flight safety. (Simon and Grubb, 1994, p. 47)
Comparing this study to the Kanki and Foushee study shows that there is a non-linear
relationship between the number of flights together as a crew and the safety and performance
of a crew. While flying together a few times may decrease safety and performance errors,
more permanent crew pairings seem to increase the errors. What could be described in figure
one as a 'Familiarity Cycle' seems to occur.
18
Though the exact number of errors with an associated number of flights has not been
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battle-rostering policy. As a result of the Simon and Grubb study, the Army changed its
battle-rostering policy (Appendix A). The Army now focuses its crew coordination effort on




ID. VP FORCE INTRODUCTION
A. GENERAL OVERVIEW OF VP FORCES
The Navy's VP force currently includes 12 active duty and 8 reserve VP squadrons.
Both active and reserve squadrons currently operate the fleet's newest patrol aircraft, the P-
3C. The VP community is unique among Naval aviation communities in that the integration
of active duty and reserves is easier. First, both active and reserve squadrons support the
same missions and operate nearly identical platforms. Second, they require aircrew
integration for proficiency, and though forward deployed, squadrons are land-based. Third,
the high experience level of an average P-3 reserve crew makes them comparable in mission
effectiveness to an active duty crew.
The history of the VP community can be traced back some 40 years. During this
period of time the community has flown several variants of aircraft from the P-2V Neptune
to the P-3 Orion. These aircraft have been used in various missions including; surface
surveillance, mining, search and rescue (SAR), anti-surface warfare (ASUW), and anti-
submarine warfare (ASW). The final mission on this list was especially important during the
Cold War where P-3's were constantly flown against Soviet ballistic missile and fast attack
submarines in a high-stakes game of cat and mouse. The VP community garnered a
reputation as being particularly effective at the ASW mission. As a result, the VP community
is known throughout the military almost exclusively for its ASW prowess.
The VP Community's Cold War success in the ASW arena has become a community
trademark—one which to this day serves as both a blessing and a curse. While many naval
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decision makers are aware of the ASW role, few realize the variety of missions being
performed today. As a result, some critics of the VP force feel the VP community is no
longer a necessity. Meanwhile, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) continues
to build and deploy a serious number of front-line ballistic missile and fast attack submarines
each year. Also, the proliferation of submarine technology throughout the third-world
continues to pose a future ASW concern. In addition, many overlook the fact that the VP
community is currently called upon to perform a number of non-ASW missions around the
world.
Despite the increase in operational commitments, the VP community has seen a
dramatic decrease in its end strength numbers. The height of the Reagan defense buildup in
1988 marked the apex in strength for the VP community with 24 active duty and 13 reserve
squadrons. Beginning in FY-88 the VP community began to undergo a series of inevitable
changes as a result of the military-wide downsizing. Consequently, the FY-97 total VP
force has been reduced to 12 active duty fleet squadrons and 8 reserve squadrons. This force
structure has gone even below the "glide slope" of the original 13 active duty and 9 reserve
squadrons proposes in the CNO's FY-97 Navy budget. The figures below show a breakdown
of the active duty and reserve VP squadrons as ofFY-97 as compared with those in FY-88.
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FY-88 vs FY-97 Active Duty VP Squadrons by Location.
LOCATION FY-88 SQUADRONS FY-97 SQUADRONS
NAS Moffett Field, CA VP-9, 19, 46, 47, 50 None
NAS Barbers Point, HI VP-1,2, 4, 17, 22 and 40 VP- 4, 9 and 47
NAS Brunswick, ME VP-8, 10, 11,23, 26 and 44 VP-8, 10, 11* and 26
NAS Jacksonville, FL VP-16, 24, 45, 49, 56 VP-5, 16 and 45
NASWhidbey, WA None VP-l,40and46
Note: * Squadron conversion to reserve Maritime Reconnaissance (VQ) underway
FY-88 vs FY-97 Reserve VP Squadrons by Location.
LOCATION FY-88 FY-97
NAS Whidbey, WA VP-69 VP-69
NAS Moffett Field, CA VP-91 VP-91
NAS Point Mugu, CA VP-65 VP-65
NAS New Orleans, LA VP-94 VP-94
NAS Glenview, EL VP-60 and 90 None
NAS Memphis, TN VP-67 None
NAS Detroit, MI VP-93 None
NAS Jacksonville, FL VP-62 VP-62
NAP Andrews, MD VP-68 None
NAS Willow Grove, PA VP-64 and 66 VP-64 and 66
NAS South Weymouth, MA VP-92 None
NAS Brunswick, ME None VP-92
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The wholesale series of disestablishments of active and reserve VP squadrons
between FY-88 and FY-97 has left the VP community as a shadow of its former self. For
the active duty and reserve forces these reductions represent a decrease in end-strength of
50 and 38 percent, respectively. Despite these decreases, world-wide VP commitments
remained nearly constant. In order to meet the commitments active duty squadrons
increased their reliance on reserve augmentation.
B. VP CREWMEMBER PROFILES
A crew of eleven (five officers and six enlisted) make up a standard P-3 crew. The
five officer crew positions are the three pilots, Patrol Plane Commander (PPC), second
pilot (2P) and third pilot (3P), a tactical coordinator (TACCO), and a
navigator/communicator (NAVCOMM). The enlisted crew consists of two flight
engineers (FEs), two acoustic operators (SSI & SS2), a non-acoustic operator (SS3), and
an in-flight technician (IFT). Each crewmember performs positional specific tasks which
support the overall mission of the crew. Though each crewmember' s specific tasks vary
greatly, depending on mission profile and any special equipment installed, a general
framework of positional roles and responsibilities can be described.
There are two physical pilot seats in the P-3 and three pilots assigned to a
standard crew. This 'extra' pilot allows for seat rotation to reduce crew fatigue Crew
fatigue is an important safety concern in the VP community, considering that a full mission
can include a three hour pre-flight and over ten hours airborne. Among the pilots, the
PPC is senior and is responsible for the safe operation of the aircraft throughout the
mission. In addition to the safe operation of the aircraft to and from base, the PPC is
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tactically responsible to best position the aircraft for optimal sensor performance and
effective buoy/weapon drops. The 2P and 3P serve as a backup to the PPC and are in-
training to become PPCs.
The FE sits between the pilots and functions as the non-tactical aircraft systems
expert. With the numerous indicator lights, gauges, and circuit breakers, to monitor, the
FE serves as the 'inside observer' while the pilots physically fly the aircraft. The second
FE is assigned to the crew for seat rotation and is typically in training to become a fully
qualified FE.
The senior of the two Naval Flight Officers (NFO) assigned to the crew is the
TACCO. The TACCO, as the name implies, is responsible for coordinating the entire
tactical effort. At his station the TACCO receives input from all the sensor stations and
directs the most effective use of the aircraft's tactical systems, sonobuoys, and weapons.
The other NFO is the NAVCOMM who is responsible for the accurate navigation
of the aircraft, logging the aircraft's geographical position throughout the mission, tactical
communications, and assisting the TACCO. The NAVCOMM is typically in the training
syllabus to become a TACCO.
As the two acoustic system operators, SSI and SS2 are responsible for detecting
and classifying acoustic contact gained on active and passive sonobouys. This multiple
buoy information is presented to the TACCO along with suggestions on possible target
course and speed. The SSI and SS2 stations are co-located and very similar as they
perform the same core task with the SSI distinguished as the senior of the two only in
terms of experience. SS2 is typically in the training syllabus to become a SSI.
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The SS3 operates the non-acoustic sensors such as the radar, electronic support
measures (ESM), and the magnetic anomaly detector (MAD). He reports information
gained on his sensors to the TACCO for target identification and prosecution.
Additionally, he reports navigational radar fixes to the NAVCOMM and surface contact
information to the flight station.
The IFT is an experienced avionics troubleshooter. As the tactical systems expert,
the IFT insures that the avionics equipment is fully operational during pre-flight and
replaces or repairs faulty equipment while in-flight.
The diversity among crew member tasks, combined with the relatively large crew
size, requires an exceptional amount of crew-coordination. For these reasons, the VP
community has typically been at the forefront in crew-coordination training efforts.
1. Differences between active/reserve crewmembers
Although the crew positions are the same for active and reserve squadrons, there
are important differences in the experience level of the respective crew members. In most
cases each reserve crewmember has served one or more three-year active duty tours in a
VP squadron. This has a dramatic effect at the so called 'entry level' positions such as 3P
and NAVCOMMs. For example, a reserve pilot may only be assigned as a 3P, yet still
have well over 1500 total flight hours in the P-3 and have been a PPC in his last active
duty tour. In contrast, a newly assigned 3P in an active squadron typically has only 30
hours in the P-3 and needs a minimum 1 8 months in further training to become a
designated PPC. Similar situations exist for NAVCOMMs, SS2s, and others.
Total flight hours are not the only difference between active duty and reserve
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aircrew. Other crew attributes such as time on current crew, time in squadron, and time
since initial positional qualification seem to be significantly different. To investigate this
hypothesis the four previously mentioned crew attributes were collected on one reserve
squadron, VP-91, and one active squadron, VP-10 (Appendix B). The crew attributes
were then compared for the 84 reservists versus 84 active personnel.
2. Crew profile comparisons
The months in squadron comparison, shown in figure two, shows that the average
reserve crewmember has been in the squadron longer. The average for active









Correspondingly, the time spent on the same crew is longer for reserves as well.
The current readiness system's emphasis on crew unity encourages squadrons to leave
crews together indefinitely. Figure 3 is a histogram comparing how many months active
or reserve crewmembers have been on the same crew. The data collected in the reserve
squadron was limited to two years because identifying which crew a person was on only
went two years back. In many instances reserve crewmembers have been on the same
crew for five or more years so the reported average is low. The average for reservists is
still 1 8.9 months compared to only 6.3 months for active crew members.
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The next two figures present the individual experience level difference between
reservists and their active duty counterparts. Figure 4 presents the individual flight hour
comparisons between the two squadrons.
Indv. Flight Hours
Active vs. Reserve




Reservists had a range of 179 to 3,900 flight hours and an average of 2,193 total flight
hours. The active squadron average was 1,562 with a wider range of 200 to 5,292 flight
hours.
Figure 5 below further breaks down the experience by measuring how many
months since their initial positional qualification. This comparison was restricted to the
officer positions because many of the enlisted aircrew have come from other aircraft with
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the same rating. The difference is large because in an active squadron all of the 3Ps and
many of the 2Ps and NAVCOMMs are still upgrading to PPC or TACCO. It typically
takes 12 to 18 months for a new 3P or NAVCOMM to become a PPC or TACCO.
Conversely, in reserve squadrons all 2Ps, 3Ps, and NAVCOMMs have already attained a
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IV. VP READINESS SYSTEM
A. OVERVIEW OF CURRENT SYSTEM
In military units combat readiness simply refers to whether a unit is certified ready
for combat. The training aspect of readiness is reported by readiness categories (c-
ratings). Training readiness for aircrew is measured in the Navy by mission area. For a
multi-mission aircraft, such as the P-3, an individual crewman is considered combat ready
in a single mission area, called primary mission areas (PMA), if he gains 75 or more
percentage points out of 100. The Naval Air Reserve Force instruction on readiness
(COMNAVAIRRESFORINST 3500.54) fits the individual readiness to the squadron level
by simply taking a mathematical average of all flight crews in that PMA. The instruction
then states that all combat ready aircrew should be formed into theoretical crews. Thus
the final squadron combat rating comes from calculating the number of combat ready
theoretical crews and dividing by the total number of possible crews assigned. This
percentage is then used to report a subsequent C-rating as shown below.
C-ratings C-l C-2 C-3 C-4
% crews combat ready 85-100% 75-84.9% 65-74.9% < 65%
Within the VP readiness system there is a much stricter crew composition
requirement. Rather than set up theoretical crews after the individual qualifications are
complete, the VP system requires that crews gain their qualifications as a formed crew.
The VP system focuses on what it calls the crew tactical nucleus (TACNUC), which
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consists of the senior pilot (PPC), tactical coordinator (TACCO), senior acoustic systems
operator (SSI), and non-acoustic systems operator (SS3).
The VP readiness training matrix itself is a fairly complex mix of 37 events6 which
qualify in seven primary mission areas. The table below shows the primary mission areas
(PMAs), what they essentially measure and how many of the 28 reserve readiness events
feature that PMA.
PMA NAME MEASURES EVENTS
MOB crew mobility non-tactical quals such
as instrument check for
pilots
7of28/25%








MIW mine warfare ability to accurately
place mines in a hostile
or non-hostile
environment
5 of 28/ 17.8%





C2W command and control ASW skills in a multi-
unit coordinated event
12of28/42.8%
CCC command, control, and
communications
ASU skills in a multi-
unit coordmated event
15of28/53.6%
6 Reserve squadrons have nine less events due to differences in tactical equipment
from their active duty squadron counterparts. For example, reserve squadron aircraft are
not maverick missile capable and are not required to complete the associated 'maverick
qualification'.
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As noted in the event column, a single event may carry points in several PMA areas or
focus on only one. Below is an example oftwo events along with their associated PMA
points.
EVENT ASU ASW MIW MOB ccc INT C2W
C2W2 5 2 5 2 3 10
M1W1 65 10
The way the point spread is distributed, being qualified in the major warfare areas
(ASU, ASW, MIW, and INT) tends to carry the other PMA areas (C2W, CCC). 7 The
major tactical events are further distinguished by either being an initial qualification or
currency qualification. For example, a crew would first fly the ASU 5 for the initial ASU
qualification. This qualification is good for three years and requires the TACNUC plus the
NAVCOMM. The reserve training instruction describes the crew coordination aspect of
initial qualifications with the following note:
Crew coordination advanced qualification event. This event is conducted
as a crew evolution. TACNUC crewmembers required to obtain this crew
qualification must be assigned to the crew per the crew list. Crew
qualification remains current based on continued integrity of three of four
of the crew's TACNUC crewmember composition.
(COMRESPATWINGLANT/PACINST 3500.4 ID II-A-5)
In summary, for initial qualifications the entire TACNUC must be present and the
qualification is only good for the entire three year period if three of four TACNUC remain
on the crew.
7 The MOB PMA is essentially a starting point. A crewmember cannot fly
tactically unless his MOB qualifications are current.
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The second aspect of advanced qualifications is the currency event. Continuing
with the above ASU example, the ASU 6 currency would be flown after the ASU 5. The
readiness instruction requires that currency qualifications are flown with at least three of
four TACNUC present. Currency qualifications expire after one year.
The scheduling aspect of the TACNUC requirements for both currency
qualifications and initial qualifications drive the readiness picture for reserve squadrons.
Remember that reservists are only available between one and two weekends per month.
Any qualification period lost can mean months before that crew's entire TACNUC is again
available on the same day as the training resource needed (i.e. simulator time, range
period, or target). Despite the best planning efforts, reserve squadron training officers
typically spend the few days before drill weekends trying to find alternative crews and
qualifications to schedule in response to last minute TACNUC crewmember absence. In
this situation, a training officer often is unable to find an entire alternate crew who is
available and needs the particular qualification. Instead, he may opt to reduce an initial
qualification to a three of four TACNUC currency qualification or, as a last resort, turn
the event into a freeplay, or practice period. In interviews with reserve wing and squadron
training officers it is estimated that between 30% to 50% of all scheduled readiness events
are changed or canceled due to TACNUC scheduling problems.
With such a large percentage of training events affected, the issue becomes a
serious efficiency of resources question. There is often a significant amount of resources
dedicated to these training events. Consider the crews from Pt. Mugu, California who
must travel to Whidbey Island, Washington for a simulator or a crew from Whidbey that
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flies to the torpedo range in Hawaii. Consequently, the TACNUC constraints can have a
large impact on the efficient use of valuable training assets.
B. TACTICAL PROFICIENCY COURSE
The tactical proficiency course (TPC) was created in 1993 to standardize tactical
communications and increase squadron member's awareness of how each individual
crewmember's tasks fit into the overall mission. The course is similar to many CRM- type
programs throughout the military and the civilian sector. What does make TPC different
is that its primary focus is on mission effectiveness rather than flight safety. TPC's
attempts to standardize each crew position so that temporary or permanent crew changes
do not effect crew performance. Theoretically, any TPC trained crewmember can walk
on to another crew and know exactly what is expected of him, recognize standard tactical
phraseology, and communicate effectively with all other crewmembers on the very first
flight. Currently the TPC course and its associated qualification events are not formally
tied to the readiness system in reserve squadrons.
C. ALTERNATIVES
During the SME interviews, subjects were asked to present some possible changes
to the current crew coordination rules that might ease the scheduling difficulties without
compromising crew coordination training. The difference between the two resulting
alternatives address one of the fundamental questions of this thesis—whether training with
a set crew list significantly improves crew coordination and mission effectiveness.
The first alternative is essentially a slight relaxation of the current system's crew
coordination rules. The second alternative proposes a much more comprehensive change.
35
1. Alternative One - Relaxed TACNUC Rules
In this alternative the currency and initial TACNUC rules are changed from four of
four for initial qualifications and three of four for currencies to three of four for initial
qualifications and two of four for currencies. This alternative is not a sweeping change. It
merely eases some of the scheduling difficulties while embracing the current readiness
system's TACNUC requirements..
2. Alternative Two — Discarded TACNUC Rules
In contrast, alternative two is a sweeping change. Alternative two would discard
all TACNUC scheduling requirements and allow all crewmembers to gain their initial and
currency qualifications as individuals. Squadron wide readiness would then be computed
using the 'theoretical' crew model suggested by COMNAVRESFOR instructions. A key
aspect of this alternative is that the new TPC system would be the venue for all crew
coordination training and the readiness training schedule would not be subjected to any
crew composition constraints.
Below is a summary of the two alternatives and how they address crew
coordination:
Initial Qua! Currency Qual Crew
Coordination
Current System 4 of 4 TACNUC
required
3 of 4 TACNUC
required
tied to all readiness
qualifications
Alt. One 3 of 4 TACNUC
required
2 of 4 TACNUC
required
tied to all readiness
quals (relaxed)









V. ANALYSIS OF ALTERNATIVES
Through SME interviews the alternatives were analyzed using three criteria;
anticipated increase in squadron readiness, possible impact on crew coordination, and
political feasibility. The increase in squadron readiness is primarily a measure of increased
efficiency. These efficiency gains are then balanced against any perceived loss in crew
coordination training.
A. ANTICIPATED INCREASE IN SQUADRON READINESS
Current wing and squadron training officers were asked to estimate the possible
percentage increase in squadron readiness for each alternative. The training officers used
recent schedules and memories from prior tours to estimate a percentage increase. This
estimate ranged from 10-20% increase for the relaxed TACNUC alternative and a 30-
40% increase for the discarded TACNUC/individual qualifications alternative. While
these estimates may seem like remarkable increases in squadron readiness, the rule
changes essentially remeasure what is already there. For example, when a crew
composition constraint in the current system forces an unneeded currency or freeplay the
training still occurs yet is not measured by the current readiness system. In an extreme
case, consider a crew that completes several freeplays to a crew which doesn't do any
training during the same period. While both crews have not gained any readiness points
on paper, the freeplay crew is certainly more combat ready in real terms. A change in the
current system would allow more of these freeplays to become documented readiness
qualification events.
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In terms of efficiency alone, either alternative looks attractive. However, the
anticipated increase in efficiency has to be balanced with any perceived loss in crew
coordination. The alternatives must also address possible resistance from the active fleet
on readiness points gained under a different system. Both the change in crew coordination
and active fleet resistance are difficult to quantify. Yet, both are critical issues concerning
any changes to the current system and must be addressed.
B. POSSIBLE IMPACT ON CREW COORDINATION
The impact on crew coordination is arguably the most important aspect of any
changes to the current system. Since alternative one is merely a relaxed version of the
current system, it is doubtful that it would have a substantial crew coordination impact in
either direction. Conversely, alternative two is a fundamental shift in the crew
coordination aspect of readiness training and requires careful analysis. This analysis of
alternative two is broken into four subareas; new emphasis on TPC/ACT, real world
operations, reserve vs. active crew attributes, and current crew coordination research.
1. New Emphasis on TPC and ACT Programs
The current readiness system is not the only VP training program which addresses
crew coordination. As discussed in chapter IV, the TPC system attempts to standardize
the tactical crew's interaction. The aircrew coordination training (ACT) also attempts to
standardize crew interaction in terms of flight safety. The emphasis on both programs has
increased since the new readiness system was adopted. TPC is now required for all crews
and consists of 20 hours of classroom time followed by three simulators flown as a crew.
Many SME interviewees mentioned that the requirements associated with each separate
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program seemed like a "duplication of effort". With crew coordination being addressed in
both TPC and ACT, training officers felt some of the crew composition constraints of the
readiness system were unnecessary, especially when considering the severe scheduling
problems they create.
Additionally, the TPC and ACT approach to crew coordination seem be in conflict
with the approach taken by the readiness system. TPC and ACT emphasis standard
phraseology, standard positional tasks, and general teamwork. A TPC and ACT trained
crewmember is expected to perform his job and interact with other crewmembers the
same, regardless of what crew he is flying with. On the other hand, the current readiness
system treasures crew unity as if the interactions and individual tasks performed by each
crewmember are unique to a particular crew.
2. Real World Operations
SMEs pointed out that crew composition requirements do not reflect how crews
actually operate in the real-world environment. Currently there are no crew composition
requirements or TACNUC rules concerning operational flights. While the training
environment now dictates that crews fly exclusively as TACNUC units, real-world
operations often force squadrons to schedule by individual qualifications. As an example,
consider an active duty squadron on deployment. If the TACCO of a crew gets sick and is
unable to fly his crew is not taken off the schedule, instead, another qualified TACCO fills
in and the crew flies the mission minus one TACNUC. A few such substitutions combined
with strict crew rest requirements can lead to a situation where many crews are flying with
mixed crews for several days. While mixed crews have become an operational scheduling
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necessity, few have complained that it decreases mission performance. In fact, one of the
only motivators to get a crew back together is the possibility of getting some readiness
qualifications during future operational events.
For reservists the most visible example of the "real-world ops" argument is the
performance of reserve crews in Operation Desert Shield / Storm. The two reserve crews
which participated were made up of volunteers from several crews and had not completed
readiness training as TACNUC crews. These mixed crews performed extremely well as
noted by the Commander Patrol Wings Pacific at the time,
...I want to lay down an early marker that says our Reserves played a
substantive role early and throughout this historic confrontation...you all
performed superbly... all did exactly as I knew they would - they worked
hard, they were completely professional and they were easily integrated
into our active force operations... (Rear Admiral A. R. Maness,
COMMPATWTNGSPAC message DTG 132355Z March 1991)
Reserve participation in future conflicts will probably see the same mixed crew approach
since reservists who offer voluntary recall are often available sooner than an official
Presidential recall of reserves.
The mismatch of crew composition requirements in readiness training and the
scheduling reality that reserves and active forces face was mentioned by many SMEs.
Interviewees often mentioned the phrase, 'let's train the way we fly" to convey how the
readiness system's crew composition constraints do not reflect the actual combat readiness
it is designed to measure.
3. Crew Attribute Differences
As discussed in chapter three, the differences between active and reserve crews
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total flight time, time on crew, time since initial qualification, etc. all point out the vast
experience level a typical reserve crew has. An important aspect of this experience is that
flying on a crew is not a new thing for most reservists as it is for an active duty
crewmember. For example, active duty 3Ps and NAVCOMMs are typically fresh from
positional technical training and have little experience in flying on a crew. Conversely, a
typical reserve 3P or NAVCOMM has already served one or more active duty tours and
has several hundred hours of flying experience in a crew environment. The significant
difference in crew experience may mean that reservists gain little from TACNUC
requirements that were designed introduce the crew concept to active duty crewmembers.
4. Current Research
Recent crew composition research, as detailed in chapter two, suggests that battle
rostering can have a negative impact on mission effectiveness and safety. The negative
impact may be even more pronounced for reserve crews for two reasons. First, reserve
crews tend to stay together as a crew much longer than their active duty counterparts
(Figure 3). Second, a reserve crew flies much less non-crew events than an active duty
crew since a higher percentage of reserve flights are devoted specifically to readiness
training. This means reserve crews, under the current readiness system, are much further
to the right on the familiarity cycle and could have a higher tendency of complacency and
overconfidence.
C. POLITICAL FEASIBILITY
Political feasibility of each option is an essential issue. The necessity for active
forces to identify with and accept reserve training methods may preclude creating a system
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unique to the reserves. For this reason, alternative one can be viewed as the least
disruptive to the status quo. Gaining commands would continue to identify with the
TACNUC aspect of alternative one. Alternative one's relaxed TACNUC rules are a
simple compromise between having the exact readiness system as the active forces and
increasing the efficiency of reserve readiness scheduling.
Alternative two would certainly impact the status quo more. With a distinctly
different readiness system, in terms of crew coordination, some would undoubtedly
question the equity of a combat ready reserve crew vs. a combat ready active crew. In the
case of alternative two, a dilemma between "efficient use of crews/assets vs. mirroring the
fleet's training requirements" emerges. Both efficient use of resources and similarity to
the fleet requirements are desired in reserve training as indicated in the Naval Reserve
Force strategic plan,
Efficiency —...We will pursue innovative technologies and methodologies
to provide the best education and training and most efficient cost for our
personnel from affiliation to retirement...
Similarity — ...We will continue to refine our Training Plans to meet
Active Component training requirements...
(www.ncts.navy.mil/nabresfor/stratei.html)
Closely following the TACNUC requirements used by fleet active forces has created an
unintended resource inefficiency in the reserve readiness qualification process. In this
case, there seems to be a choice, or at least a balance, between similarity and efficiency.
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The current VP readiness system's TACNUC rules are creating serious scheduling
constraints for all VP reserve squadrons. These constraints have a great impact on
efficient use of valuable training resources. Through SME interviews, the estimated the
number of events affected by TACNUC rules are between 30% to 50%. Each affected
event must be rescheduled in one of the following ways:
• event is changed to another crew
• event is reduced from a full TACNUC 3 year qualification to a 3 of 4
TACNUC 1 year currency qualification
• event becomes a freeplay practice session for the remaining available
crewmembers
• event is canceled
In each case above, the squadron training officer is forced to chose an option that is lower
on his training priority list and has less benefit for squadron readiness. The resulting
resource inefficiencies might be acceptable if the subsequent crew coordination training,
safety of operations, and mission effectiveness were all tied to using permanently formed
crews. However, current crew coordination research in the Army and Air Force indicate
that both safety and mission effectiveness decrease during long-term fixed crew
operations.
Accordingly, the VP readiness system's TACNUC rules should be abandoned in
favor of an individually based qualification system which measures whole squadron
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readiness by forming 'theoretical' crews. With an individual qualification system, crew
coordination training will still be addressed through the existing TPC and ACT programs.
TPC and ACT are recognized as valuable training methods for standardizing positional
tasks, improving crew communication, and fostering teamwork. Moving to an
individually based qualification system would eliminate the current conflict between TPC
and ACT standardized training and the current readiness system's emphasis on crew
unique skills. Using an individual system is also expected to increase overall squadron
readiness levels by 30% to 40% according to SME interviews.
A. FURTHER RESEARCH
As an interim step, a new individual readiness system should be pilot tested in one
squadron. After several months, this squadron could participate in a WST/OFT 'fly-off
versus a reserve squadron still using the current system. Grading should be performed by
active duty wing instructors unaware of the participating crew's different readiness
systems. Using active duty wing instructors would also facilitate credibility with the active
duty equity issue.
Further research should attempt to correlate past crewmember experience with
crew coordination requirements. Also, a determination of the typical point where crew
overconfidence and complacency overrides the short term positive effects of familiarity
would be useful.
The crew system has a long history in patrol squadron aviation. While one study
may not be enough evidence to change a policy, the current crew coordination research
and SME testimony presented in this thesis should open the VP crew composition debate.
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APPENDIX A. ARMY POLICY CHANGE
Crew readiness level progression
for battle- rostered crews
According to U.S. Army Aviation Center
(USAAYNQ message dated 251200Z
Feb 94, crew readiness levels [CKLsj no
longer apply to aircrew training programs.
All references to CRL will be deleted with
the next change to TC 1-210: Aircrew
Training Program, Commander's Guide to
Individual and Crew Training scheduled
for first qnaxleT of FY 95.
Commanders are no longer required to
battle roster crewmembers regardless of
FAC level. However, they may still choose
to battle roster crews at their discretion.
Commanders should note that a recent
study of AH-64 crews by the U.S. Army
Research Institute revealed that battle
rostering had minimal effect on overall
mission performance and flight safety for crews who have
completed the Army's exportable training packet for crew
coordination Study data showed battle rostering had
mixed results in some instances- gunnery performance
improved with battle rostering. but crews tended to exhibit
more complacency, overconfidence, and nonstandard
coordination procedures in the cockpit.
The requirement in TC 1-215: Aircrew Training
Manual, Observation Helicopter, for an aerial observer
rA0) and aerial fire support observer
; AFSO) to be battle rostered with a
pilot-in-command (PC) tor the purpose oi
emergency aircraft handling training is
rescinded. The commander will designate
in writing PCs to conduct emergency
handling training with AOs/AFSOs.
Crew coordination training
The Army is still conducting crew
coordination training, which is separate
and distinct from crew readiness levels
and battle rostering. This training is seen
as the most effective solution for
improving crew coorcunation.
Commanders are required to implement
the Aircrew Coordination Tra I n
i
v.g
Program in accordance with USAAVNC message
201630Z Jul 93, subject: .Aircrew Coordination Training
Program.
The USAAVNC point of contact for cr?,w
coordination training is CWS Rodney Rowe or CW4 Jim
Winston. Aviation Training Brigade, DSN
553-9545/2238 (205-255-9545/2238).
—KAJ 1<3&« R. Arroyo. USAA.VNC Diractcx-att of tvaJuacoo aj-td




APPENDIX B. CREW ATTRIBUTES









CREW FLT HRS SQUAD QUAL
PPC 5 3066 Jul-96 Jul-88 PPC 14 1280 Dec-94 Nov-96
2P 5 807 Jun-95 Mar-82 2P 10 999 Jan-95 upgrading
3P 5 301 Sep-96 upgrading 3P 6 750 Jul-96 upgrading
TACCO 5 1998 Aug-96 May-87 TACCO 6 1778 Aug-96 Apr-88
NAV 5 896 May-95 upgrading NAV 6 1761 Aug-94 upgrading
SS1 5 3212 Oct-93 SS1 6 4130 Sep-93
SS3 5 392 Nov-96 SS3 6 1987 Feb-94
PPC 16 1277 Oct-94 Jan-83 PPC 2 1044 Nov-94 Oct-96
2P 4 752 Sep-95 Feb-96 2P **** ******* i *******
3P 1 624 Jan-97 upgrading 3P 2 258 Jul-96 upgrading
TACCO 4 1291 Oct-96 Nov-95 TACCO 2 2494 Nov-94 May-96
NAV 4 939 Jun-95 Feb-97 NAV 2 784 Jun-96 upgrading
SS1 4 1771 Jan-93 SS1 2 2442 Sep-92
SS3 4 5292 Jun-95 SS3 2 2120 Jun-95
PPC 14 1158 Sep-94 Mar-96 PPC 14 1484 May-94 Jan-96
2P 4 883 May-95 Feb-97 2P 14 906 Jun-95 upgrading
3P 4 306 Jun-96 upgrading 3P 5 496 Jan-96 upgrading
TACCO 4 1606 Aug-94 Nov-95 TACCO 14 1553 Sep-94 Oct-95
NAV 4 1107 Aug-96 Jul-96 NAV 8 390 Apr-96 upgrading
SS1 4 2477 Aug-93 SS1 14 1955 Jun-95
SS3 4 1399 Mar-95 SS3 14 2980 Jul-95
PPC 4 1467 Jul-94 Dec-95 PPC 4 1248 Jun-96 May-96
2P 4 685 Oct-95 Jan-96 2P 4 499 Jul-96 upgrading
3P **** innnvwikiRi ******* ******* 3P 4 566 Jul-96 upgrading
TACCO 4 1557 Mar-94 Oct-95 TACCO 4 1438 May-94 Feb-96
NAV 4 190 Oct-96 Dec-95 NAV 4 206 Apr-96 upgrading
SS1 4 1643 Oct-93 SS1 4 2071 Jun-94
SS3 4 4321 May-93 SS3 4 2027 Dec-92
PPC 3 1266 May-94 Dec-96 PPC 8 4954 Jun-96 Mar-87
2P 3 710 Jul-96 upgrading 2P 8 685 Dec-95 upgrading
3P 3 407 Jun-96 upgrading 3P **** ******* ******* *******
TACCO 3 1080 Nov-94 Mar-96 TACCO 23 1402 Mar-94 Oct-95
NAV 3 796 Nov-95 upgrading NAV 8 762 Sep-95 upgrading
SS1 3 1925 Mar-95 SS1 23 1992 Feb-92
SS3 3 2923 Oct-94 SS3 8 1543 Jan-96
PPC 6 2950 Jun-96 Feb-92 PPC 12 2438 Feb-96 Aug-88
2P 6 906 Mar-95 Jan-97 2P 7 892 Feb-95 Dec-96
3P 3 739 Feb-96 upgrading 3P **** ******* ******* *******
TACCO 6 2144 Jun-95 Dec-88 TACCO 12 2145 Jan-96 Oct-87
NAV 6 459 Jul-95 upgrading NAV 10 628 Nov-95 Feb-97
SS1 6 3010 May-94 SS1 14 2879 Jun-94







me in months on current crew "" = position
total individual flight hours
date assigned to current squadron




CREW FLT HRS SQUAD QUAL
PPC 24 2270 Sep-93 Jan-90
2P 24 2245 Sep-93 Dec-88
3P 24 2923 Feb-95 May-87
TACCO 9 2254 Aug-94 Oct-88
NAV 7 1720 Aug-96 May-89
SS1 7 1340 Mar-89 Nov-91
SS3 24 1525 Aug-94 Oct-94
PPC 24 2466 Apr-90 Apr-86
2P 5 2542 Apr-93 Nov-87
3P 3 2551 Dec-96 May-92
TACCO 24 3050 Nov-89 Oct-85
NAV 24 992 Apr-94 Mar-84
SS1 8 3496 Dec-83 Apr-84
SS3 24 1818 Oct-93 Jun-94
PPC 24 2300 Oct-94 Mar-90
2P 24 1782 Nov-92 Feb-90
3P 24 2788 Nov-92 Jan-88
TACCO 24 2685 Jul-91 Jul-85
NAV 24 2594 May-90 Dec-85
SS1 24 1793 Sep-84 Sep-84
SS3 24 3910 Sep-91 Sep-84
PPC 24 3927 Sep-91 Jan-86
2P 24 2262 Jul-92 Jun-89
3P 4 2050 Nov-96 Mar-92
TACCO 24 2370 Dec-95 Nov-88
NAV 24 1344 Oct-90 Oct-84
SS1 24 1520 Apr-94 Jun-87
SS3 24 2520 Jul-91 May-87
PPC 12 1953 Feb-95 Jun-90
2P 12 2243 May-93 Aug-89
3P 12 1761 May-94 Aug-89
TACCO 12 1853 Sep-95 Dec-89
NAV 12 2010 Nov-95 Dec-89
SS1 12 1000 Oct-95 Jun-87
SS3 12 3352 Aug-90 May-87
PPC 24 3164 Oct-91 Mar-85
2P 24 1611 Jan-95 Jan-90
3P 24 2263 Mar-94 Jul-90
TACCO 7 1125 Aug-96 Feb-93
NAV 12 2385 May-94 May-86
SS1 24 1577 Mar-96 Sep-86
SS3 24 3884 Sep-88 Aug-89
CREW FLT HRS SQUAD QUAL
PPC 24 3087 Oct-91 May-86
2P 24 2831 Dec-91 Dec-84
3P 24 1797 Sep-92 Sep-90
crew 7 TACCO 24 2290 Feb-93 Apr-86
NAV 24 856 Mar-91 Aug-91
SS1 8 3041 Jun-96 Aug-87
SS3 3 1850 Oct-96 Jun-88
PPC 24 2353 Apr-92 Sep-87
2P 24 3191 Mar-94 Dec-86
3P 24 2100 Sep-93 Jul-92
crew 8 TACCO 24 2922 Feb-95 Nov-86
NAV 24 1311 May-95 Aug-90
SS1 24 755 May-91 Mar-92
SS3 24 1127 Mar-95 Sep-92
PPC 24 1028 Oct-91 Jun-85
2P 24 2466 Dec-90 Dec-87
3P 24 1400 Oct-91 Mar-87
crew 9 TACCO 24 2821 Aug-91 Dec-86
NAV 24 3200 Mar-90 Apr-82
SS1 24 1445 May-86 Aug-87
SS3 24 3165 Jun-93 Apr-90
PPC 24 3916 Sep-91 Sep-85
2P 24 2300 Nov-92 Dec-89
3P 13 1861 Jan-96 Aug-92
crew 1 TACCO 8 2465 Aug-96 Aug-89
NAV 5 2067 Aug-96 Jan-92
SS1 6 157 Jul-96 Oct-95
SS3 24 179 Dec-96 Feb-83
PPC 24 2773 Jul-91 Jan-88
2P 17 2474 Jan-93 Sep-89
3P 12 2131 Jan-95 Jul-93
crew 1
1
TACCO 24 2331 Oct-89 Mar-85
NAV 24 3528 May-94 Feb-92
SS1 24 2122 Dec-77 Jun-81
SS3 24 727 Oct-92 Nov-92
PPC 24 1995 Aug-93 Mar-90
2P 6 2311 Feb-96 Oct-91
3P 5 1842 Oct-96 Sep-91
crew 1
2
TACCO 24 1754 Aug-89 Aug-84
NAV 5 2356 Oct-96 Jul-86
SS1 13 1980 Jul-95 Jun-89
SS3 24 2725 Nov-94 Dec-87
VP-91
RESERVE
CREW = time in months on current crew
FLT HRS = total individual flight hours
SQUAD = date assigned to current squadron
QUAL = date attained current positional qual
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